Illustration: Liu Rui/GTA new report funded by Australia's Department of Defense played up security risks to submarine cables in the Indo-Pacific waters and pointed finger at China and some other countries over alleged undersea‑cable attacks in recent years, while claiming threats against subsea cables are growing. A Chinese expert said that accusing China without conclusive evidence constitutes "over‑securitization" made by Australian side, as well as a calculated pretext for its own military expansion. Published by the National Security College at the Australian National University (ANU), the paper claimed recent damage to cables in the Baltic Sea and around China's Taiwan region suggests "state actors are now actively probing and testing cable infrastructure in peacetime as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies" to rapidly degrade connectivity at the outset of a conflict, The Australian reported. The paper claimed 16 privately owned subsea cables that carry 99 percent of Australia's internet traffic are a "high priority target" for Australia's adversaries that could be severed in a conflict, threatening the nation's economy and social fabric, according to The Australian. The report singled out China and Russia for blame, saying that there have been multiple apparent attacks on submarine cables in recent years in European waters as well as near China's Taiwan region, suspected to be linked to Russia and China, the Straits Times reported. However, the report cites a 2025 voyage by Chinese research vessel Tan Suo Yi Hao along Australia's western and southern coastlines as evidence to back its claim that "potential adversaries are actively gathering information about Australia's cable infrastructure." This report, relying on the routine scientific operations of a Chinese research vessel in 2025 to level allegations of offensive actions against China, and employing ambiguous terminology such as "suspected" and "potential," demonstrates Australia's evidentiary leap, Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Center of East China Normal University, told the Global Times on Monday. This erroneous claim was refuted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the time. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on March 31, 2025 that China carries out normal activities at sea in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. "We hope Australia will have a right understanding of this and stop the groundless suspicion and speculations," Guo added. This is not the first time certain Australian politicians has leveled baseless accusations of China intending to sabotage its undersea cables. Back in May, Defense Minister Richard Marles claimed during the Shangri-La Dialogue that China ought to boost transparency around its maritime operations. He also asserted that a surge in damage to subsea cables had transformed the seabed into a "battlefield," per The Australian. Chen said Australian side's scaremongering is tied to its predictive threat‑perception framework forged in recent years. This framework designates China and other countries as strategic competitors in advance, subsequently forces routine scientific activities into a confrontational framework, Chen said. Apart from unfounded allegations against China, the paper claims Australia's defense military "must incorporate the defense of submarine cable infrastructure into its operational planning," according to The Australian. It added the government should also consider up¬grading an auxiliary ship operated by the navy, ADV Guidance, to enable it to repair damaged cables. The vast majority of submarine cable damages are caused by accidental factors such as fishing operations and vessel anchoring, rather than deliberate sabotage. For suspected cases of intentional damage, independent technical investigation bodies should be established, and the principle of "investigate first, characterize later" should be strictly applied, so as to prevent ordinary maritime accidents from escalating into diplomatic conflicts, Chen said. The core problem of Australian side's submarine cable security lies entirely with itself. Instead of addressing its own infrastructure shortcomings and improving its domestic protection and maintenance systems, the Australian side has chosen to continually exaggerate external threats and stoke bloc confrontation, the expert added. Chen said that by fabricating alleged Chinese threats, Australian side seeks to "rationalize" its military spending increases and underwater force expansion. The submarine digital infrastructure originally meant to serve global development has been labeled along us versus them lines, and this constitutes the biggest hidden danger, he added. 。主域名（如`example.com`）是网站的根地址，承担品牌展示与流量聚合的核心作用；子域名（如`blog.example.com`）则是主域名的分支，用于独立功能模块或细分业务。
C | 了解主域名和子域名的区别，合理规划二者的关系，既能提升内容管理效率，也能优化搜索引擎抓取逻辑。
D | 推荐选择RAKsmart独立服务器，其采用双路电源冗余与BGP多线网络，保障99.99%在线率。例如，搭载NVMeSSD的机型可将页面加载时间压缩至1秒内，避免因延迟导致的跳出率上升。
E | 2.子域名的独立部署方案 若子域名承载高并发业务（如会员系统），建议分配独立服务器资源。
F | RAKsmart云服务器支持分钟级创建实例，每个子域名可绑定独立IP并配置专属防火墙规则，防止跨站点攻击。例如，电商促销期间为`sale.example.com`临时扩容至4核8G配置，轻松应对流量峰值。 3.SSL证书的统一管理 主域名与子域名需分别部署HTTPS加密。
G | RAKsmart虚拟主机提供免费SSL证书自动签发，支持通配符证书（`.example.com`），一次性覆盖所有子域名，兼顾安全性与管理效率。 四、常见误区与避坑指南 1.滥用子域名导致权重分散 避免为少量内容单独开设子域名，例如仅5篇文章的博客使用`blog.example.com`，可能被搜索引擎判定为内容稀疏站点。
H | 2.资源分配不合理引发性能瓶颈 若主域名与多个子域名共享同一服务器，易因资源竞争导致访问卡顿。建议根据业务规模选择RAKsmart弹性云方案，按需分配CPU、内存与带宽，例如为主域名预留2核4G资源，子域名按0.5核1G动态分配。
I | 3.忽略解析生效时间 新增子域名需等待DNS全球生效（通常2-24小时），使用RAKsmart的AnycastDNS服务可将生效时间缩短至30分钟内，减少业务空窗期。 主机推荐小编温馨提示：主域名与子域名的协同使用，既能强化品牌统一性，又能实现业务灵活扩展。对于中大型网站，建议选择RAKsmart混合云架构，通过主域名绑定独立服务器保障核心业务，子域名按需调用云服务器资源，兼顾成本与性能。其全球骨干网络加速与智能运维面板，可大幅降低多域名管理复杂度，访问RAKsmart官网获取定制化部署方案，开启高效站点架构升级！
申请创业报道，分享创业好点子。点击此处，共同探讨创业新机遇！。
Current article:http://www.cuancuguanzhongnieqinyazhun.cyou/list_llld/8vx6ffp.html
